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Summary 
A latecomer to supplementary funded pension provision, Italy’s multi-pillarisation plan was 
launched in the 1990s under extremely adverse conditions. Supplementary schemes were 
expected to achieve universal coverage primarily relying on second pillar occupational pension 
funds. Twenty-five years after its launch, the comprehensive plan can hardly be called successful 
with respect to both coverage and the relative importance of second and third pillar institutions. 
Extreme variation in coverage rates between occupational categories and across economic sectors 
suggests, however, that these developments cannot be merely interpreted as a consequence of 
institutional resilience and path-dependent dynamics. The article applies an ‘actor-centred 
institutionalist’ framework to respond to three main questions. What explains the still limited 
coverage of supplementary pillars in Italy? What factors account for the prominent role played by 
third pillar pension schemes in contrast to policy-makers’ original intentions? Which factors allow 
us to understand the significant variation in coverage across both occupational categories and 
economic sectors? 
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1. Introduction 
Supplementary funded pensions were barely existent in Italy until the mid-1990s. In fact, the 
single pillar pension system, which combined compulsory pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes with 
universal coverage of the employed population and a tax-financed safety net for the elderly poor, 
provided comparatively generous earnings-related benefits with replacement rates of around 75 
per cent after a 40-year career, thereby ‘crowding out’ supplementary private pensions (Jessoula, 
2011a). 
This changed in the early- to mid-1990s when governments started to retrench public pensions to 
restore financial sustainability. Public pensions were reformed in combination with the launch of 
a comprehensive plan to build a multi-pillar pension system (Table 1). A typical tripartite 
corporatist agreement then introduced the first regulatory framework for supplementary DC 
pensions in 1993 with two main aims: i) to ensure universal coverage of the employed population 
– or at least, employees – in supplementary pillars, compensating for the expected decline of 
public pension levels in the following decades; ii) to make second pillar occupational funds, 
managed by the social partners, the cornerstone of supplementary pension provision.  
Twenty-five years later, this plan for transforming the Italian pension system into a multi-pillar 
architecture is far from being accomplished, and in three main respects has completely failed. 
First, coverage remains limited to a minority of the employed population – 7.8 million individuals 
out of the 23 million employed workforce are members of supplementary schemes. Secondly, 
coverage rates show remarkable variation across economic sectors and occupational categories. 
Thirdly, contrary to policy-makers’ original intentions, third pillar personal pension schemes 
(PIPs) managed by financial players cover the lion’s share of supplementary pillars – despite their 
higher management costs, higher-risk portfolios and fewer participatory rights for members. 
How can we explain these results? While the limited coverage comes as no surprise, considering 
that the transition to a multi-pillar architecture was launched under the most adverse conditions 
in Italy – resource scarcity and policy constraints (see Section ‘Enabling multi-pillarisation: 
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tripartite bargaining and inconsistent choices’) – and in light of historical institutionalist claims 
of institutional resilience (see Section ‘Analytical framework and methodology’), the substantial 
variations in coverage (see Figure 3) remain hard to explain. Similarly, the major role assumed 
by third pillar pensions calls for an explanation, since the original framework was designed by 
the social partners and government to ensure the predominance of second pillar occupational 
pensions.  
This article addresses these puzzles which make Italy an interesting case study. It adopts an 
‘actor-centred institutionalist’ framework, which appears particularly suited for interpreting the 
above-mentioned elements of both stability and change in the supplementary pillars. The 
analytical framework and methodology are outlined in the second section, while the third section 
juxtaposes the key features of the 1990s multi-pillar plan with the current situation of 
supplementary pensions in Italy. The ‘ actor-centred institutionalist’ framework is then applied 
in the three following sections to analyse and interpret the evolutionary trajectory of Italian 
supplementary pillars between 1993 and 2016. This is followed by a concluding section. 
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2. Analytical framework and methodology 
Transposing Douglas North’s analytical approach (North, 1990) to the analysis of public policies, 
historical institutionalist works have greatly contributed to understanding the dynamics of welfare state 
change in the last two decades. They have shown that institutional development – i.e. policy change à la 
Pierson (1994) – mostly occurs incrementally, gradually, ‘at the margin’, following key decisions at so-
called ‘critical junctures’ – in accordance with a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ model. This is the consequence 
of the interplay between well-known political dynamics such as ‘policy feedbacks’ (Easton, 1965) and 
specific mechanisms of institutional change, especially ‘increasing returns’ and ‘lock-in effects’ (Pierson, 
2000). In other words, once a path is chosen, reversing initial choices is difficult, and path-shifts or 
‘departures’ occur rarely, mostly prompted by ‘external’ shocks. Institutions and policy-setting are thus 
essentially resilient, resistant to change, and development dynamics are largely path-dependent. The 
methodological implication is that when it comes to explaining policy/institutional change, ‘history 
matters’: i.e. previous choices at critical junctures and policy legacies are key to understanding subsequent 
development trajectories, since pre-existing policy-setting significantly constrains policy-makers’ 
choices.  
The application of the historical institutionalist framework to the analysis of pension system 
developments has therefore emphasised the importance of institutional inertia and the limited scope for 
policy convergence. In particular, the seminal work by Myles and Pierson (2001) has argued that the 
scope for developing funded pension schemes alongside a PAYG pension system is limited due to the 
‘sunk cost’ of existing pension arrangements and the prominence of the so-called ‘double payment 
problem’. Moreover, the transition from a single to a multi-pillar system is particularly difficult and 
inertial dynamics are stronger when the PAYG system is ‘wide and mature’, when public schemes are 
‘earnings-related’ – i.e. when pensions are perceived as ‘earned rights’, making retrenchment (more) 
difficult (Myles and Pierson 2001) –, and when resources are scarce, as in the current phase of 
‘permanent austerity’.  
Despite merits, more recent contributions have criticised historical institutionalism for being far more 
effective in explaining institutional stability than change (Streeck and Thelen, 2005), while a growing 
body of literature has stressed that, despite constraints, pension (and welfare) arrangements do change 
and have actually transformed substantially in the last two decades (Bonoli and Palier 2007; Palier, 2010; 
Hinrichs and Jessoula, 2012; Ebbinghaus, 2012; Natali, 2017).  
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Taking account of the elements of both stability and change that have characterised the process of 
pension multi-pillarisation in Italy in the last 25 years, this article therefore applies an ‘actor-centred 
institutionalist’ framework, with two main theoretical implications.  
On the one hand, we contend that existing policy (institutional) settings not only put constraints on 
policy-makers’ choices, but also present opportunities, with the constraining/enabling effect of policy 
legacies ultimately depending on players’ interests and value frameworks with respect to the existing 
institutional structure: as such, it has to be assessed empirically rather than presumed theoretically.  
On the other hand, and consequently, this approach assigns ‘agency’ and agents – i.e. social and political 
actors involved in the decisional process – a more prominent role in the interpretative framework than 
in the historical institutionalist analysis.  
Within this framework, we also argue that two different levels of analysis are relevant to understand 
funded pension developments. On the one hand, the politics of supplementary pensions needs to be 
analysed, focusing on policy-making processes leading to key reforms. Here, the focus is put on the key 
players, primarily the government and the social partners (both trade unions and employer 
organisations), but increasingly, as we will see below, groups representing financial sector interests.  
On the other hand, implementation of occupational pension schemes requires analysing stakeholder 
strategies against the backdrop of industrial relations and taking structural factors such as the economic 
structure into account.  
Accordingly, the empirical analysis included in the article relies on qualitative research based on 
‘process tracing’ (Collier, 2011). The analysis of policy-making in the periods leading to key reforms of 
supplementary pillars in Italy (1992–1993, 1995, 2000, 2004–2005, 2006–2007) relied on careful scrutiny 
of official documents, minutes of parliamentary debates and a review of the relevant press articles. 
Different sources were used and relevant information was cross-checked through a typical 
‘triangulation’ strategy, as well as through the conduction of 17 semi-structured interviews with key 
informants, including the former Ministry of Welfare in 1995–1998, the former president of Assogestioni 
(the national association of asset management companies), several directors and presidents of 
occupational pension funds as well as experts (see list at the bottom).  
 
 
3. Twenty-five years of pension multi-pillarisation 
In Italy, several public pension reforms were adopted in the last quarter of the century, most of which 
involved retrenchment. Importantly, when the 1995 ‘watershed reform’ introduced a notional defined 
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contribution system (NDC) with a 40-year phasing-in period, the role of public pensions in maintaining 
income was expected to decline sharply (Figure 1, solid line): in 2010, when new retirees would still 
receive earnings-related benefits, the replacement rate was expected to remain above 75 per cent, 
decreasing to 60–65 per cent in 2030–2040 when the NDC would fully apply to all new retirees. To 
compensate for the reduced generosity of PAYG schemes, subsequent governments in the 1990s–2000s 
planned to develop supplementary pensions based on pre-funding. In the ‘grand plan’ launched in the 
1990s, the income maintenance function was thus deliberately assigned to the interplay between state 
and market, i.e. between the mandatory public system and supplementary funded pillars. The data from 
the Ministry of Welfare (2002) reported in Figure 1 (dotted line) show that, for workers fully subject to 
the NDC system (approximately retiring after 2035), the combination of first pillar pensions and 
supplementary benefits will ensure the maintenance of comparatively high (and not declining) 
replacement rates in future decades. This clearly assumed universal coverage of supplementary pillars: 
however, as we will see below, some key choices were inconsistent with this objective.   
 
Figure 1 here  
 
The 1993 regulatory framework for ‘private’ pensions and subsequent revisions allowed different types 
of second and third pillar supplementary schemes to be set up, all providing defined contribution (DC) 
benefits. A minimum return guarantee was introduced in 2005, but only for workers enrolled via the 
‘silent consent mechanism’ (see Section ‘From tripartism to pluralism: financial industry power and the 
‘new politics’ of supplementary pensions’); in all other cases, workers may choose between diverse 
portfolio compositions and different types of DC benefits at retirement – among which the most 
common are lifelong benefits and lifelong combined with survivor pensions. ‘Closed’ pension funds 
(CPFs) were designed as typical occupational (second pillar) pension schemes, established as non-profit 
institutions by trade unions and employer representatives via collective agreements, thus according the 
social partners participatory rights. Since the regulatory framework does not allow CPFs to manage 
assets themselves, they usually rely on a small staff while contracting out fund management to financial 
institutions like banks, insurance companies, investment firms or asset management companies.  
Mainly targeting the self-employed, two different types of supplementary funded schemes constitute 
the third pillar. ‘Open’ pension funds (OPFs) and ‘personal pension plans’ (PIPs). OPFs are formally 
hybrid institutions, comprising both second and third pillar elements – depending on affiliation modes 
(i.e. individual vs. collective) – but they mostly operate as third pillar schemes. They are directly set up 
by financial institutions – such as banks, insurance and investment companies –, have a lean governance 
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structure, but count on a much more robust organisation for asset management and promotional 
activity. Employees have no right of participation in management boards, and members of the 
supervisory board are directly appointed by the managers of the financial institution setting up the 
fund.  
The 2000 revision of the regulatory framework also allowed the establishment of PIPs, personal pension 
schemes set up via life insurance contracts. As with OPFs, they do not provide for any board 
representation of policyholders, and protection of the latter’s interests is delegated to an individual 
(Responsabile del fondo) appointed by the insurance company. Both OPFs and PIPs are allowed to manage 
directly their assets.  
Supplementary pillars started to develop in 1997–1998. By 2007, membership had reached 3.4 million – 
also boosted by major regulatory changes in 2005 (see Section ‘From tripartism to pluralism: financial 
industry power and the ‘new politics’ of supplementary pensions’) – but growth was then curbed in the 
aftermath of the 2008 global financial shock and ensuing prolonged economic stagnation (Figure 2). In 
2017, i.e. 25 years after the launch of the pension multi-pillarisation plan, supplementary coverage is 
still far from universal in Italy. According to the most recent data, membership of second/third pillar 
funded pension schemes is modest, at around 7.8 million out of 22.5 million employed (Covip, 2017) – 
corresponding to a coverage rate of 28.3 per cent if compared to a total workforce of 25.5 million 
individuals. Importantly, in December 2016, closed and open pension funds had 2,596,000 and 1,258,000 
members respectively, while figures were higher for PIPs, around 3.3 million (Covip, 2017). 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
Membership figures however only tell part of the story. Diverging trends and results appear when 
looking at the different supplementary pension schemes. Membership of second pillar closed pension 
funds even decreased during the Great Recession, from just above 2 million members in 2010 to 1.94 
million in 2014; similarly, the take-up rate2 of CPFs declined slightly from 41 per cent to 40 per cent of 
potential members between 2007 and 2015 (Figure 3). Some signs of recovery have appeared recently, 
with membership increasing by about 600,000 in 2014–2015 – mostly due, however, to developments in 
the construction sector (see Section ‘Structural and organisational factors matter’). By contrast, 
individual third pillar pension plans, such as OPFs and especially PIPs, have been more effective in 
attracting new members. Importantly, the attraction of both OPFs and PIPs goes beyond the traditional 
                                                 
2 The take-up rate is calculated as the ratio between the number of workers affiliated to pension funds and potential 
members, the latter defined in relation to the economic sector covered by the collective agreement/CPF.  
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constituency of self-employed, with employees increasingly turning to individual pension plans, as 
witnessed by the massive increase in PIP membership – +1.2 million in five years (2012–2016), of whom 
600,000 are private sector employees.  
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Looking in greater detail at second pillar CPFs, we find, first, significant coverage variation between 
economic sectors (Figure 3). CPF take-up rates are in fact very high – between 70 per cent and 90 per 
cent – in core industrial sectors such as energy, chemicals and pharmaceuticals; and around 40 per cent 
in the large fund (1 million potential members) for metalworkers. By contrast, rates are extremely low 
– with figures around 10 per cent – in retail, tourism, fashion and more generally the service sector. Such 
variation calls for an explanation, as does the significant increase in take-up in the construction sector – 
from below 10 per cent to almost 90 per cent between 2014 and 2015 (see Section ‘Structural and 
organisational factors matter’). 
Second, it needs to be stressed that although total membership is limited, the average contribution rate 
in CPFs is comparatively high, usually ranging between 9 per cent and 10 per cent of gross wages for 
employees. Third, when broken down by age, CPF take-up is low (19 per cent) among workers younger 
than 35, increases to 27 per cent in the 35–44 age bracket and reaches 34 per cent for workers older than 
45. 
Finally, take-up varies substantially across the different occupational categories. Currently, total 
coverage is 26.9 per cent among private sector employees, 21.3 per cent among the self-employed, but 
only around 5 per cent among public sector employees (Covip, 2017).  
Two main conclusions can be drawn from this, in turn leading to four main questions. The first 
conclusion is that the comprehensive multi-pillarisation plan for the Italian pension system, reducing 
the importance of the public pension system while expanding supplementary pillars to achieve 
universal coverage, is far from being achieved, and might even be deemed to have de facto failed 25 
years on. The second conclusion refers to the factors behind such failure. It cannot simply be argued 
that policy legacies and the ‘double payment problem’ have constrained supplementary pillar 
expansion – as mainstream historical institutionalist literature contends –, since the figures presented 
above suggest that in several economic sectors both substantial resources were found – as shown by the 
high contribution rates in supplementary pillars – and membership has significantly expanded to reach 
comparatively high coverage levels (60 per cent to 80 per cent). 
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So what explains the still limited supplementary pension coverage in Italy, substantially hindering 
pension multi-pillarisation 25 years after its launch? Why does coverage vary substantially across 
occupational categories, with only limited take-up among public sector employees (and atypical 
workers)? What factors account for the prominent role played by third pillar pension schemes, 
especially PIPs, contrary to policy-makers’ original intentions of greater reliance on second pillar CPFs? 
As for the latter, which factors drive affiliation and, thus, help us understand the significant coverage 
variation across funds and economic sectors? 
We address the first two questions in the next section, analysing the introduction of the 1993 regulatory 
framework from a twofold perspective. On the one hand, we outline the conditions under which the 
multi-pillarisation plan was initiated. On the other, these conditions allow us to understand some key 
initial decisions related to both affiliation to and funding of the new supplementary pillars and 
explaining total coverage and the inclusion/exclusion of various occupational categories.   
 
4. Enabling multi-pillarisation: tripartite bargaining and inconsistent choices 
In the early 1990s, the transition from a single pillar to a multi-pillar pension system seemed most 
unlikely in Italy. Neo-institutionalist analyses have stressed that such a transition is hampered by the 
so-called ‘double payment problem’, which is most severe when the public pillar is financially 
unsustainable, and is particularly difficult to overcome in mature PAYG and earnings-related systems 
(Myles and Pierson, 2001). In such cases, more resources are needed to honour the PAYG system and 
make it sustainable. Moreover, economists emphasise that the development of funded pensions is most 
unlikely when available resources are scarce (Orszag and Stiglitz, 1999): i.e. when first pillar 
contribution rates are high, when the public deficit/debt is high and/or when other constraints on public 
expenditure rule out generous tax incentives, and no reserve (buffer) fund exists.  
The Italian situation in 1992–1993 was striking in that it presented very adverse conditions for 
establishing and developing funded pensions. Public PAYG pension schemes were ‘mature’, covered 
the whole workforce and delivered generous earnings-related benefits – they were thus difficult to 
retrench in the short term since they involved ‘acquired rights’. The gap between revenues and 
expenditure was growing, and the first pillar contribution rate was very high – 26 per cent in 1992 and 
rising to 33 per cent when the NDC system was introduced in 1995. These two conditions combined 
clearly ruled out the introduction of additional (compulsory) contributions to finance supplementary 
pillars. Moreover, other sources to finance the transition to a multi-pillar system were not available: 
public debt was extremely high  – 117.3 per cent of GDP in 1992, the highest in Europe – and the budget 
deficit equalled 10.5 per cent of GDP (1991) at a time when the ‘Maastricht convergence criteria’ for 
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joining the Euro-club had just put strict constraints on public finance. Finally, there was no reserve fund 
and no reliable forecast pointing to increasing resources from higher employment or faster economic 
growth. In a nutshell, there seemed to be no available resources to finance the transition to a multi-pillar 
architecture.  
Nevertheless, in 1992–1993, the Amato government committed to introduce supplementary DC 
pensions, and policy-makers embarked on the path towards pension multi-pillarisation despite the 
unfavourable conditions mentioned above. The Italian government framed the policy-making process 
as typical tripartite concertation: the technocratic nature of the cabinet actually suggested fully involving 
the social partners – who had had a stake in pension policy-making for decades (Jessoula, 2011a, 2011b) 
– in order to manage the delicate exercise of both retrenching public pensions (for the first time) and 
‘opening to market’ by designing a regulatory framework for ‘private’ supplementary pension schemes. 
The three major trade unions – Cgil, Cisl and Uil – and the main employers’ association were thus fully 
involved in negotiations.  
While ‘agency’ was thus not lacking, to understand fully how the pension multi-pillarisation puzzle was 
solved in the early-1990s, we need to acknowledge that, in accordance with the analytical framework 
outlined in the Section 2, institutions – i.e. policy legacies – not only represent obstacles for policy 
change, but may have enabling potential. In other words, policy legacies are not just constraints but also 
opportunity structures for policy-makers. While the existence of a broad-based and mature PAYG system 
– together with budget constraints – reduced room for manoeuvre to develop funded pensions, Italian 
policy-makers exploited the existing social protection structure to find the necessary financial resources. 
In particular, following a four-month concertation process, the Amato cabinet and the social partners 
agreed on using a pre-existing compulsory severance payment named TFR (Trattamento di Fine Rapporto) 
to overcome the double payment problem and finance supplementary funded pillars. The TFR was de 
facto a ‘deferred wage’ paid by companies to employees upon termination of the employment contract, 
and calculated as 6.9 per cent of workers’ gross wages for each year of service.3 The 1993 regulatory 
framework therefore included a key provision allowing workers to transfer voluntarily the TFR to a 
‘closed’ occupational fund (CPF) set up by a collective agreement. More precisely, the first regulatory 
framework for supplementary pensions (Decree 124/93) prescribed that, in case of affiliation to 
occupational funds, the TFR was to be fully merged into the latter.4  
                                                 
3 See Jessoula (2011a) for details. 
4 This applied to workers first hired after April 1993. For those already in employment, collective agreements would 
define the share of TFR to be transferred to CPFs.  
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Importantly, such ‘choice’ for the TFR as the primary source of financing of funded pillars – i.e. second 
pillar CPFs – had implications for some key features of supplementary pensions in Italy, which relate 
to the two questions above.  
The first implication concerns the voluntary character of affiliation to supplementary schemes as well as 
the balance between funded pillars. The social partners consented to the usage of the TFR under two 
conditions: i) application of the voluntary principle, i.e. letting workers freely decide whether to keep 
the TFR or transfer it to funded schemes; ii) the possibility to transfer the TFR to occupational funds 
only, in order to assign closed occupational funds a prominent role in supplementary pension 
provision.5 In particular, at the request of the social partners, the compulsory transfer of the TFR to 
pension funds was ruled out for two reasons. First, while workers’ organisations acknowledged the 
need to develop supplementary pillars to compensate for the projected decline in public pension levels 
in future decades, they did not want compulsorily to expose workers to financial market risks – also in 
light of the modest but guaranteed rate of return on TFR contributions.6 Second, unions’ favourable 
attitude towards the voluntary transfer of the TFR matched the interests of Confindustria, the main 
employers’ confederation, because the TFR (as a deferred wage) constituted an important and relatively 
cheap source of self-financing for many firms, especially the high number of small and micro-
enterprises characterising the Italian economic structure. Confronted with the united front of trade 
unions and employer representatives, the government – which was also divided internally in relation 
to the principle of voluntary versus mandatory affiliation (Jessoula, 2009) – easily accepted the social 
partners’ conditions.   
The second implication of choosing the TFR as the main source of financing is that occupational 
categories not entitled to the TFR were de facto excluded from supplementary pension coverage: inter 
alia public sector employees – at least until 2000 when the TFR rules and, consequently, those regarding 
supplementary pensions, were extended to this category7 – and ‘project workers’ (so-called 
parasubordinati mostly working as bogus self-employed). 
In sum, although the TFR represented a key ‘institutional gate’ allowing the transition to a multi-pillar 
system under extremely adverse conditions (Jessoula, 2011a), the ‘choice for the TFR’ as the main source 
of financing did not come without costs. In particular, the voluntary character of affiliation – requested 
by social partners as a condition for using the TFR – was inconsistent with the goal of universal coverage 
                                                 
5 A residual role was then assigned to OPFs, as witnessed by the provision allowing workers to become members 
of these funds only if a ‘dedicated’ occupational fund was not available in their economic sector.  
6 According to Law 297/82, the rate of return guaranteed by the TFR is 1.5 per cent plus 75 per cent of the inflation 
rate.  
7 Coverage of public sector employees remained low even after 2000 because the creation of dedicated CPFs was 
extremely slow.  
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in supplementary pension pillars. Similarly, reliance on transferring the TFR to pension funds severely 
hampered the inclusion of some key occupational categories such as public sector employees in 
supplementary pillars. Twenty-five years on, the main consequence of this move is the limited coverage 
of second pillar pensions: as in other European countries which moved from single pillar to multi-pillar 
pension systems, large coverage gaps appeared when affiliation was not made compulsory either by 
law or via collective agreements. Italy is no exception in this respect.   
But the 1990s plan has not only been hard to accomplish with regard to coverage. As seen above, another 
key element – the prominent role assigned to collective CPFs in supplementary pension provision – has 
recently been lost. We now turn to this issue.   
 
5. From tripartism to pluralism: financial industry power and the ‘new politics’ of supplementary 
pensions 
The key question here is what factors account for the primary role currently played by third pillar pension 
schemes, especially PIPs, contrary to policy-makers’ original intentions of greater reliance on second pillar 
CPFs. To provide an answer, we need to retrace the main steps of supplementary pillar development 
between 1993 and 2016 (Table 1) from two different angles: first, showing how important changes in the 
politics of funded pensions led to substantial modifications of the original regulatory framework; secondly, 
analysing the implementation of supplementary pension schemes by the various players involved – 
primarily, the social partners and financial players. Let us turn to the former first. 
As discussed above, when the regulatory framework was established in 1993, the critical budget situation 
did not allow generous tax incentives for supplementary pensions, with the consequence that no pension 
fund was created under the new rules8. Two years later, however, the development of supplementary 
pensions became a prominent issue in the tripartite concertation process launched by the ‘technocratic’ 
Dini government with the social partners, aimed at both further reforming the public pillar and revising 
supplementary pension rules. The decision to replace the earnings-related schemes with a NDC system in 
the first pillar was decisive, since it assigned funded pensions a key role in compensating for the expected 
sharp decline in the public pension replacement rate, especially for younger cohorts.  
As in 1992–1993, the social partners were again involved in the policy-making process due to their 
traditional role in managing the TFR: this, again, ruled out the compulsory transfer of the latter to pension 
funds. Nevertheless, the overall framework had changed. On the one hand, the government was aware 
that more resources – including tax incentives – were needed to develop supplementary pillars effectively, 
                                                 
8 The national banking national association (ABI) lamented that the tax regime included disincentives to 
establishing supplementary funded schemes: see the interview in Il Sole 24 Ore, 10 March 1993. 
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both inducing social partners and financial actors to set up pension funds and making supplementary 
schemes more appealing to employees. Importantly, on the other hand, following the adoption of the 1993 
regulatory framework a number of relevant players representing financial institutions’ interests had 
entered the stage of (supplementary) pension politics. At least three powerful groups, respectively 
representing the banking sector (ABI), the insurance sector (ANIA) and resource management companies 
(Assogestioni) were interested in measures fostering the development of supplementary pillars. 
Accordingly, they ‘pressured’ the government to boost the expansion of what would represent, for them, 
a gold mine (‘mega-business’9). The final solution included in Law 335/95 was receptive to these requests, 
with the tax regime for funded pensions made more favourable: a) incentives for employees and 
employers increased, with contributions up to 2 per cent of gross annual income (max. ca. €1300) becoming 
deductible; b) taxes on pension funds were reduced. All was ready for the take-off of supplementary 
pillars, as actually occurred – as shown in the third section.  
A similar policy-making dynamic unfolded a few years later, when a centre-left cabinet accommodated 
demands by social and especially financial actors to revise the regulatory framework to support more 
effectively supplementary pension development. Decree 47/2000 contained some key measures, inter alia 
further augmenting the deductibility of (employers’ and employees’) contributions – up to 12 per cent of 
gross annual income and to a maximum of €5165; and enhancing the menu of supplementary pension 
provision by setting out the rules for establishing personal pension plans (PIPs), while extending tax 
incentives to these typically third pillar institutions. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
When compared to the tripartite decision-making of 1992–1993, the political processes in both 1995 and 
2000 were more open and pluralistic, also involving the powerful associations representing financial sector 
interests. At this stage, however, financial actor influence was kept in check by the social partners’ veto 
power on some key issues: primarily, the voluntary character of supplementary pillars – linked with the 
voluntary transfer of the TFR to a pension fund – and the prominent role of occupational CPFs vis-à-vis 
third pillar institutions.  
Things changed substantially, however, in 2001 after the release of projections on the decline of public 
pension replacement rates – from ca. 70 per cent in 2010 to around 50 per cent in 2030 –, and of figures 
indicating lower take-up rates of supplementary pensions among young workers. The newly appointed 
                                                 
9 Article published in Il Sole 24 Ore, 4 May 1995. 
14 
 
centre-right cabinet led by Silvio Berlusconi drafted a reform proposal based on two main elements: i) 
full exploitation of the TFR through the compulsory transfer of the latter to supplementary funds; ii) 
regulatory harmonisation between second and third pillar supplementary pension schemes with a view 
to achieving a level playing field. The aims were both to achieve definitively universal supplementary 
pension coverage and to stimulate competition between second (CPFs) and third pillar (OPFs, PIPs) 
institutions. The first measure was expected to mobilise a large amount of resources – more than €12bn 
per year, or around 1 per cent of GDP (Ministry of Welfare, 2002) – to develop funded pensions. The 
second was fully in line with financial players’ requests. 
The government’s bill – which had been drafted unilaterally – provoked harsh reactions by the unions, 
protesting against the end of traditional tripartite bargaining in supplementary pension policy-making, 
the compulsory transfer of the TFR to funded schemes which would obligatorily expose workers to 
market risk, and the proposed regulatory harmonisation between occupational CPFs and ‘pure’ market 
institutions created and managed by financial actors – which would favour the latter.10 Interestingly, in 
contrast to the unity displayed by the social partner in the 1990s, the main employer association 
Confindustria initially sided with the government and financial players, because the compulsory transfer 
of the TFR was associated with a reduction in contribution rates in the first pillar, which made the 
overall package attractive for employers. The unions, however, did not surrender, and instead launched 
a prolonged phase of mobilisation against the government’s plan. Agreement was not reached until 
four years later, when the adoption of the public pension reform substantially changed actor coalitions. 
In fact, the dropping of the envisaged contribution reduction in the first pillar altered the relative 
attraction of the overall plan for the employers, and Confindustria stopped supporting the compulsory 
transfer of the TFR to funded schemes, split with the government and financial players and eventually 
sided with the unions.11 This change prompted a harsh and unprecedented reaction from two powerful 
fronts. While the ‘financial block’ (ABI, ANIA, Assogestioni) supported the government’s reform plan, 
the traditional ‘social block’ formed by unions and the main employers’ association called for the 
maintenance of certain key features of the original regulatory framework: namely, the voluntary 
transfer of the TFR and a clear distinction (with different sets of rules) between second and third pillar 
institutions.12 The same split also cut across government lines, with Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia party 
backing the financial block, and the Northern League Minister of Welfare Roberto Maroni supporting 
social partners’ main stances.   
                                                 
10 See the joint document issued by the three main unions Cgil, Cisl and Uil during the strike called on 24 October 
2003.  
11 See Jessoula (2009) for a detailed analysis. 
12 Joint documents by the social partners issued in February and July 2005. 
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After the Minister of Welfare threatened to resign, should the revision of the regulatory framework 
completely level the playing field between second and third pillar schemes13 thus making it ‘excessively’ 
in favour of financial players, a compromise was eventually reached in Legislative Decree 252/05 which 
included relevant new clauses in supplementary pension rules. In line with social partners’ requests, 
the decree did not include the compulsory transfer of the TFR, while a mechanism of ‘silent-consent’ 
transfer of the latter to CPFs was introduced in order to expand supplementary pension coverage.14 This 
also came with the provision of a minimum return guarantee in the case of ‘silent enrolment’ in CPFs. 
However, the financial block also gained. The decree provided for substantial regulatory harmonisation 
between the two supplementary pillars, and in the case of non-silent enrolment workers were free to 
decide to transfer the TFR either to a second pillar CPF or to a third pillar OPF / PIP, thus removing all 
restrictions regarding first affiliation. Moreover, the tax regime was made even more generous, 
especially with respect to benefits which were then taxed at a lower rate (decreasing from 15 per cent to 
9 per cent in accordance with how long a worker had been a member of the fund).  
The adoption of Decree 252/05 thus represented a milestone in various respects.  
With regard to decision-making, the long phase between 2001 and 2005 put an end to tripartite 
bargaining over supplementary pensions, with powerful financial actor associations now playing a 
prominent role and very much conflictual dynamics emerging between the various players involved. 
Such ‘new politics’ of supplementary pensions, characterised by much more open competition among 
the various pressure groups, thus ultimately turned from tripartite concertation to pluralistic policy-making 
(Jessoula, 2011b).  
This influenced reform content and, subsequently, the balance in the relative importance of the second 
and the third pillars. In fact, while the ‘silent-consent’ mechanism favouring second pillar CPFs was 
only to a certain extent successful in increasing CPF membership, regulatory harmonisation 
significantly boosted third pillar expansion (see Figure 2). PIP membership accelerated after 2005 and – 
in contrast to stagnating CPF membership during the Great Recession – continued to grow rapidly in 
the following years. In 2011, PIPs overtook CPFs in terms of total membership, hence becoming the 
cornerstone of supplementary pension pillars (Figure 2). Such development is the consequence of the 
regulatory changes seen above, combined with organisational factors that significantly differentiate CPFs 
and PIPs. The latter may actually count on a much more robust organisation for aggressive promotional 
and marketing strategies, making them more effective in recruiting new members – not only among the 
                                                 
13 See the minutes of the Council of Ministries, 5 October 2005.   
14 In accordance with the silent-consent mechanism introduced in 2005 and revised in 2006, from January 2007 
private sector employees have six months – either at the time of first employment or when they get a new job – to 
decide whether they want to keep the TFR or to transfer it to a supplementary pension fund. Should they remain 
‘silent’, the TFR is paid by default into an occupational CPF. 
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self-employed but also among employees, the traditional CPF constituency –, despite significantly higher 
management costs when compared to CPFs and also OPFs.  
By contrast, the capacity of occupational funds to promote membership is more limited when compared 
to PIPs and varies greatly between economic sectors. This leads to the fourth and last question: what 
explains the significant variation in coverage across economic sectors and occupational funds presented 
in Figure 3?  
 
6. Structural and organisational factors matter 
To answer this question, we need to identify which factors actually drive affiliation to CPFs. Several 
arguments have been proposed to explain why the take-up rate for private pension schemes has 
remained limited: i) TFRs and pension funds are not perfect substitutes in terms of returns, risks and 
liquidity (Cozzolino et al., 2006); ii) financial market performance has been modest since the early 2000s; 
iii) the choice in favour of pension fund is irreversible, whereas workers may always choose to transfer 
the TFR to a fund.  
These factors, however, do not explain the extreme variation in take-up rates across economic sectors 
shown in Figure 3 above. Structural and organisational factors seem key in this respect. As to the former, 
a specific feature of the Italian economy, namely the large share of micro/small firms and their 
employment of roughly half of dependent workers, needs to be considered. As to the latter, we should 
not perceive trade unions as unitary actors – as we did in the analysis of the politics of supplementary 
pensions above: rather, we need to acknowledge that (the three) worker confederations are fragmented 
organisations, whose representational capacity (as well as interests and value frameworks) varies 
substantially across economic sectors and in relation to company size. 
CPF take-up rates are (very) high in sectors dominated by medium-sized/large companies – mostly 
employing more than 50 employees – in the chemical, energy and pharmaceutical sectors, whereas they 
are very low in the retail, service and tourism sectors, where micro (below 10 employees) and small 
(below 50 employees) firms predominate. The key factor here concerns the different presence of trade 
unions, as well as the diversity of employer strategies, dependent on company size. In medium-
sized/large companies, trade unions and employers typically cooperate to foster enrolment in 
occupational schemes. By contrast, trade union presence is limited (if any) in micro/small firms, leading 
to less information and reduced incentives for workers to enrol in the dedicated fund. Moreover, in such 
a context, employers often ‘pressure’ employees to keep the TFR within the company15 due to its 
                                                 
15 Interview with former advisor of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection. 
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important role as a convenient form of self-financing for companies with limited/no access to capital 
markets. Such a gap between large and micro/small firms also appeared when the key mechanism for 
boosting second pillar coverage – the silent-consent formula – was implemented in 2007: though 
enjoying little success, the promotional campaign launched in support of the initiative increased CPF 
membership substantially (+64 per cent in just one year). However, this increase further widened the 
gap between covered/non-covered sectors and categories, since membership increased more in CPFs 
with already high take-up rates (+15.1 percentage points) than in less ‘attractive’ funds (+7 points only). 
In sum, the voluntary character of the supplementary pillars, coupled with an economic structure 
featuring a high share of small businesses with low unionisation rates, has severely constrained 
occupational pension development in Italy. Nevertheless, agency factors also play a role, as recently 
shown by the remarkable increase in membership – from roughly 7 per cent to nearly 90 per cent in 
2014–2015 – of the occupational fund for construction workers (Prevedi). Despite the presence of a 
multitude of micro/small firms in this sector, the social partners built on their longstanding tradition of 
cooperative industrial relations – as witnessed by the bilateral body Cassa Edile founded back in 1919 – 
to tackle limited coverage through the introduction of a (modest) compulsory employers’ contribution 
in the recently renegotiated collective agreement.16 The underlying idea here is to first make the system 
more inclusive, and then to increase contribution rates via the voluntary usage of the TFR.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Italy is a latecomer to the provision of supplementary funded pensions, since the multi-pillarisation 
plan was only launched in the early 1990s, combining substantial retrenchment in the first pillar with 
the establishment of DC supplementary pillars. Despite the extremely adverse conditions under which 
the development of funded pillars was initiated, supplementary schemes were expected to achieve 
universal coverage, compensating for declining public pension replacement rates in coming decades by 
relying primarily on second pillar occupational funds.  
The analysis has shown that, 25 years after the launch of this comprehensive multi-pillarisation plan, it 
can hardly be labelled successful in two main respects. First, supplementary pillar coverage is still modest 
and take-up rates vary substantially across occupational categories as well as across economic sectors. 
Importantly, this implies that, despite the extremely adverse conditions, in several cases resources were 
found and the double payment problem has been overcome, whereas in some sectors coverage lags behind 
despite resource availability. Secondly, while the original plan conceived second pillar occupational funds 
                                                 
16 Interviews with President and Director of Prevedi pension fund.  
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as the cornerstone of supplementary pillars, third pillar institutions (PIPs) currently play the leading role 
in providing supplementary pension coverage.  
We argued that both developments are puzzling for mainstream historical institutionalism and that they 
cannot be merely interpreted as the consequence of institutional resilience and path-dependent dynamics. 
To make sense of the actual take-off of supplementary pillars and the extreme variation in coverage, the 
‘structure-agency’ relationship is indeed key, though legacy policies and institutions need to be better 
perceived as both constraint and opportunity structures for agents involved in the politics of supplementary 
pensions. In the early 1990s, governments and social partners agreed – in a tripartite bargaining framework 
– to launch pension multi-pillarisation by exploiting a pre-existing social protection institution (the TFR) 
in order to find the necessary resources to finance supplementary pillars. Thus, theoretically, the TFR 
represented an ‘institutional gate’ allowing policy change, and the expansion of supplementary pillars 
may then be conceptualised as a case of intentional ‘layering’ through (voluntary) ‘institutional 
conversion’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). 
However, the choice of the TFR as the primary source of financing funded schemes involved the principle 
of voluntary affiliation, which is the main cause – in combination with the structural constraints imposed 
by the Italian economic structure with its multitude of micro/small firms – of both the current large 
coverage gaps and extreme variation in take-up rates across economic sectors and occupational categories. 
Similarly, the choice of the TFR has de facto excluded (until very recently) important categories such as 
public employees from supplementary pillar coverage.  
Actors’ choices and strategies are also key to understanding the changed balance between second and 
third pillar institutions in favour of the latter in the last two decades. We have shown that, after the launch 
of the multi-pillarisation plan in 1993, powerful groups representing financial sector interests gained 
influence in the ‘new politics’ of supplementary pensions – a stark case of ‘policy feedback’ –, ultimately 
transforming policy-making patterns from tripartism to pluralism. More open competition between the 
social partners and financial players in the field allowed the latter to obtain significant regulatory 
harmonisation across pillars, changing the original rules which favoured occupational second pillar funds. 
Harmonised rules have since been exploited by third pillar institutions to attract new members by relying 
on aggressive promotional and marketing strategies not available to second pillar funds due to their weak 
organisational structures and limited staff.  
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Table 1. Pension multi-pillarisation in Italy: main steps (1992–2016). 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
 
Reform First pillar 
reforms 
Second and third pillar reforms Politics of supplementary 
pensions 
1992–3 1992 ‘Amato’ 
reform 
Parametric 
changes 
1993 ‘Amato’ reform 
1993 Introduction of a 
regulatory framework for 
supplementary pillars: 
- voluntary affiliation 
- Tfr primary source of financing 
- limited tax incentives 
 
 
Consensual tripartite bargaining 
1995 ‘Dini’ reform 
– shift to a NDC 
system; 
40 year 
phasing–in 
 
‘Dini’ reform 
– more generous tax incentives 
- collective affiliation to ‘OPF’ 
possible  
Consensual tripartite bargaining 
+ 
Pressure from financial actors 
  
2000  Reform of the regulatory 
framework for supplementary 
pillars: 
– more generous tax incentives 
– partial regulatory 
harmonisation between CFPs 
and OPFs 
– introduction of personal 
pension plans PIPs;  
– extension of TFR to public 
sector employees 
 
Consensual tripartite bargaining 
+ 
Pressure from financial actors 
 
2004–5 2004 ‘Maroni-
Tremonti’ 
reform 
– parametric 
retrenchment 
measures 
2005 ‘Maroni-Tremonti’ reform 
– ‘silent-consent’ formula for the 
transfer of TFR to occupational 
pension funds;  
– deep regulatory 
harmonisation between CPFs, 
OPFs, PIPs 
Growing power of financial 
groups  
 
End of tripartite bargaining,  
conflictual dynamics and 
emergence of pluralist policy-
making 
 
Confrontation between ‘social 
block’ and ‘financial block’  
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Figure 1. The plan of the 1990s: public and supplementary pension replacement rates*.  
 
* Employee retiring at 65 years with 40 years of paid contributions. 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Ministry of Welfare (2002). 
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Figure 2. Members of supplementary pension schemes, 1998–2016.* 
 
* Total members, right scale. 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Covip (various years). 
 
 
Figure 3. Take-up rates (%) of occupational closed pension funds, 2007 and 2015. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Covip (2008, 2016). 
 
